Corazon Cojuangco Aquino didn’t win the snap election of February 1986. It was won by strongman Ferdi-nand Marcos by a margin of 800,000 votes. In the Comelec-sanctioned official count, the legal and official winner was Marcos, by a margin of two million votes.
It was thought Marcos had cheated because his Solid North votes were transmitted very late to the tabulation center at the PICC. Two Namfrel volunteers were hanged in Ilocos. The Ilocano votes were enough to overwhelm Cory’s lead in Metro Manila and other places. The canvassers claimed Marcos was cheating and so, led by the wife of a RAM major, walked out, as if on cue. The day before the celebrated incident, we, foreign correspondents, had been alerted about the planned walkout and to be there to cover it.
Initially, Cory Aquino didn’t have any participation in the four-day People Power revolt of February 22-25, 1986 or EDSA 1. EDSA 1 was triggered by greed because a henchman of the dreaded armed forces boss, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, had violated a gentleman’s agreement not to speculate on the peso-dollar rate being managed daily by the Binondo Central Bank under then Trade Minister Roberto V. Ongpin.
RVO had the Chinese trader arrested who unhappily died while under the custody of his 22 security men.
At dawn of February 22, a Saturday, Ver had the 22 military men arrested. The 22 belonged to RAM (Reform the Armed Forces Movement) of army Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.
Gringo and Enrile were plotting to overthrow Marcos. Enrile thought that with the arrest of the 22 Ongpin boys, Ver had uncovered their plot.
Enrile and RAM decided to make their last stand that noon, February 22, 1986, at Camp Aguinaldo. At 2 p.m., Enrile invited the armed forces vice chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, to join the rebellion. In the evening, Cory called Enrile asking what help she could provide. “Nothing, just pray for us,” the defense chief blurted.
Enrile wanted to take over as president. But the RAM wanted a more acceptable political figure, Cory.
Sunday morning, February 23, Cory flew by private plane to Manila from Cebu where she had spent the night (I didn’t say “hide”) at the Carmelite convent. At the airport, she was fetched by her car. On the Expressway going to Manila, she saw a column of tanks. Cory hid behind the driver’s seat. “I wasn’t sure
whether the tanks were friendly or enemy,” she explained to me later.
Sunday evening, the rebels had holed themselves up at Camp Crame. The place is more compact and easier to defend. Also, it had a bomb-proofed bunker that could take in only about 50 people. Enrile told me to go home because I couldn’t be accommodated in the bunker where enrolment was done by rank—from general to colonel to major to captain—you get the drift.
At past 9 p.m., General Ramos walked into the commotion, in tennis shirt, white shorts and jogging shoes and chomping an unlit cigar. “Who wants to join me for a walk in the camp?” he hollered.
Nobody volunteered. I did. Before we left, a aide showed him two telephone numbers, each starting with “6”—“Sir, these are the only clear lines,” he said. Those were clean lines to the Radyo Bandido of June Keithley. They were operating from the Jacinto Building near Malacañang.
General Ramos and I, with a handful of battle-ready security men, toured the Crame parade grounds. The troops were agitated because they were expecting a ground and aerial invasion by Ver’s men.
Underpowered and undermanned, the rebel troops were expecting casualties to be high, except among those inside the bunker. Ramos’s relaxed composure and casual getup somehow released tension. The master psy-war expert was in his elemental best. But the best was yet to come.
The following morning, February 24, Monday, I came to know why the “clean” landlines were important. Somebody gave Keithley a note to announce that “the Marcoses had left the country!” It was a lie.
But there was wild jubilation, nationwide. Hundreds of thousands spilled into EDSA to celebrate—not to rebel. The pictures of this throng came to be known as EDSA 1 People Power.
Tuesday morning, February 25, 1986, Cory was sworn in as President, pledging to enforce “just” laws.
Marcos was also sworn in too, becoming the only president to be reelected twice. In the evening, about 9 p.m., the Marcoses were kidnapped, according to him, by the Americans. He was brought to Hawaii, not to Paoay, his favorite hiding place.
By 10 p.m., Malacañang, the riverside presidential palace was ransacked—by the NPA for its armory, by some socialites for its jewelry, and by some foreign correspondents for its memory (Marcos’s diaries were stolen).
To be continued
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Wednesday, March 3, 2010
My EDSA I story (Part 1)
My EDSA I story (1)
Thursday, 25 February 2010 00:00
BY TONY LOPEZ
There has been so much hype and hoopla about the two EDSAs—EDSA I and EDSA II. EDSA I is the February 22 to 25,1986 People Power that ousted Ferdinand Marcos and installed Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. EDSA II is the January 20, 2001 church- and NGO-backed military coup that ousted Joseph Estrada and installed Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. I covered not one, not two, but three EDSAs.
There was a third EDSA, the May 1, 2001 popular and pedestrian uprising that nearly ousted Mrs. Arroyo were it for the effective sniping job done by the military and the police on the protesters. Nobody knows for sure how many people died or were killed by the military to protect the palace from a hoi polloi revolt.
Nobody remembers about this EDSA III anymore, but to me, it was the most spontaneous and most genuine of the three revolts.
Not many people know it but EDSA I was triggered by greed and was won by a lie. The crowds that massed at EDSA on February 24, Monday, and February 25, Tuesday, were there not to stage a revolt but to a hold a picnic.
June Keithley had announced on radio at 7 a.m. of February 24 that the Marcoses had left. It was a lie. In their glee and feeling that finally it was all over, people trooped to EDSA to celebrate.
The greed arose from a Chinese forex trader who violated the peso-dollar trading band imposed by then unofficial central bank, the Binondo Central Bank managed and headed by then Trade and Industry Secretary Roberto V. Ongpin. Ongpin had the erring trader arrested and loaded into a van. Unfortunately, the forex trader died. Unfortunately again, the trader happened to be a man of then Armed Forces chief Fabian C. Ver.
Angered, the dreaded military chief had 22 of Ongpin’s security men arrested. They were marching in full battle gear and dressed in SWAT uniform at about 4 a.m. inside Fort Bonifacio when arrested on February 22, 1986, a Saturday.
At 11 a.m., at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ongpin went looking for his security men. He called up then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile who was with the Club 365 at the Atrium in Makati.
Enrile thought the arrest of the 22 Ongpin security men, who turned out to be RAM Boys of Col. Gringo Honasan, was part of the crackdown against the plot to oust Marcos. The putsch was being planned by Enrile and his RAM Boys. The defense chief had grown disenchanted with Marcos, who was very ill, and become wary of the cabal led by Ver and the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
Enrile summoned his boys to his house on Morada Street, Dasmariñas Village. There they plotted their next moves. They decided to make a last stand at the armed forces headquarters Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City. At 2 p.m., Enrile called then Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. “Are you with us?” JPE asked Eddie. “I am with you all the way,” the latter assured.
It was not until late in the evening that Saturday that Ramos actually joined the rebellion at Camp Aguinaldo. He had contacted his loyal PC-INP commanders, like Rene de Villa in Bicol, and Rodrigo Gutang in Cagayan de Oro and found to his dismay no troops could be readily sent to Manila to reinforce Enrile’s men, then numbering less than 50, undermanned and under-armed.
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino learned about the brewing rebellion at 4 p.m. Saturday in Cebu. She led a destabilization and boycott rally there. I was there. I was covering the protest rally. After hearing about rumor of the defection, I went to the Mactan airport to book a flight to Manila. I landed in Manila shortly after 9 p.m.
With Boy del Mundo of then UPI, I took a taxi to Camp Aguinaldo. I was surprised to find the camp commander welcoming us with open arms. Enrile and Gringo had no troops at that time. Enrile had made a deal with Marcos—no shooting on the first night. Also, foreign correspondents were to be allowed inside Camp Aguinaldo.
Inside the Defense Ministry headquarters, Enrile and Ramos were giving an extended press conference. I Asked if Cory Aquino called them up, Enrile said yes. “What can I do for you?” she asked. “Nothing, just pray,” Enrile replied. It was I who asked Enrile by how many votes he cheated in Cagayan on behalf of Marcos—300,000 votes.
Enrile also claimed Cory Aquino was the duly elected president. Wrong.
A recount of the votes, by Namfrel, after Cory took over, showed Marcos was the real winner of the February 1986 snap election, not by two million votes, as canvassed by the Batasan, but by 800,000 votes as recounted by Namfrel.
(To be continued)
biznewsasia@gmail.com
Thursday, 25 February 2010 00:00
BY TONY LOPEZ
There has been so much hype and hoopla about the two EDSAs—EDSA I and EDSA II. EDSA I is the February 22 to 25,1986 People Power that ousted Ferdinand Marcos and installed Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. EDSA II is the January 20, 2001 church- and NGO-backed military coup that ousted Joseph Estrada and installed Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. I covered not one, not two, but three EDSAs.
There was a third EDSA, the May 1, 2001 popular and pedestrian uprising that nearly ousted Mrs. Arroyo were it for the effective sniping job done by the military and the police on the protesters. Nobody knows for sure how many people died or were killed by the military to protect the palace from a hoi polloi revolt.
Nobody remembers about this EDSA III anymore, but to me, it was the most spontaneous and most genuine of the three revolts.
Not many people know it but EDSA I was triggered by greed and was won by a lie. The crowds that massed at EDSA on February 24, Monday, and February 25, Tuesday, were there not to stage a revolt but to a hold a picnic.
June Keithley had announced on radio at 7 a.m. of February 24 that the Marcoses had left. It was a lie. In their glee and feeling that finally it was all over, people trooped to EDSA to celebrate.
The greed arose from a Chinese forex trader who violated the peso-dollar trading band imposed by then unofficial central bank, the Binondo Central Bank managed and headed by then Trade and Industry Secretary Roberto V. Ongpin. Ongpin had the erring trader arrested and loaded into a van. Unfortunately, the forex trader died. Unfortunately again, the trader happened to be a man of then Armed Forces chief Fabian C. Ver.
Angered, the dreaded military chief had 22 of Ongpin’s security men arrested. They were marching in full battle gear and dressed in SWAT uniform at about 4 a.m. inside Fort Bonifacio when arrested on February 22, 1986, a Saturday.
At 11 a.m., at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ongpin went looking for his security men. He called up then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile who was with the Club 365 at the Atrium in Makati.
Enrile thought the arrest of the 22 Ongpin security men, who turned out to be RAM Boys of Col. Gringo Honasan, was part of the crackdown against the plot to oust Marcos. The putsch was being planned by Enrile and his RAM Boys. The defense chief had grown disenchanted with Marcos, who was very ill, and become wary of the cabal led by Ver and the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
Enrile summoned his boys to his house on Morada Street, Dasmariñas Village. There they plotted their next moves. They decided to make a last stand at the armed forces headquarters Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City. At 2 p.m., Enrile called then Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. “Are you with us?” JPE asked Eddie. “I am with you all the way,” the latter assured.
It was not until late in the evening that Saturday that Ramos actually joined the rebellion at Camp Aguinaldo. He had contacted his loyal PC-INP commanders, like Rene de Villa in Bicol, and Rodrigo Gutang in Cagayan de Oro and found to his dismay no troops could be readily sent to Manila to reinforce Enrile’s men, then numbering less than 50, undermanned and under-armed.
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino learned about the brewing rebellion at 4 p.m. Saturday in Cebu. She led a destabilization and boycott rally there. I was there. I was covering the protest rally. After hearing about rumor of the defection, I went to the Mactan airport to book a flight to Manila. I landed in Manila shortly after 9 p.m.
With Boy del Mundo of then UPI, I took a taxi to Camp Aguinaldo. I was surprised to find the camp commander welcoming us with open arms. Enrile and Gringo had no troops at that time. Enrile had made a deal with Marcos—no shooting on the first night. Also, foreign correspondents were to be allowed inside Camp Aguinaldo.
Inside the Defense Ministry headquarters, Enrile and Ramos were giving an extended press conference. I Asked if Cory Aquino called them up, Enrile said yes. “What can I do for you?” she asked. “Nothing, just pray,” Enrile replied. It was I who asked Enrile by how many votes he cheated in Cagayan on behalf of Marcos—300,000 votes.
Enrile also claimed Cory Aquino was the duly elected president. Wrong.
A recount of the votes, by Namfrel, after Cory took over, showed Marcos was the real winner of the February 1986 snap election, not by two million votes, as canvassed by the Batasan, but by 800,000 votes as recounted by Namfrel.
(To be continued)
biznewsasia@gmail.com
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